Book Review: The Limits of Power By Jim Miles The Limits of Power – The End of American Exceptionalism. Bacevich’s new work The. An article based on THE LIMITS OF POWER. Andrew Bacevich on Charles Maier (pdf).
The Limits of Power: Andrew Bacevich on the End of American Exceptionalism. Guests. Andrew Bacevich. Retired colonel who spent twenty- three years in the US Army.
He is professor of history and international relations at Boston University and writes for a wide spectrum of publications including The Nation, Foreign Affairs, the Los Angeles Times, and The American Conservative. He became a staunch critic of the Iraq war and Bush’s foreign policy and is the author of several books, including The New American Militarism. His latest book is called The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. This is viewer supported news.
Donate. Andrew Bacevich is a conservative historian who spent twenty- three years serving in the US Army. He also lost his son in Iraq last year. In a new book titled The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, Bacevich argues that although many in this country are paying a heavy price for US domestic and foreign policy decisions, millions of Americans simply continue to shop, spend and satisfy their appetite for cheap oil, credit and the promise of freedom at home. Copy may not be in its final form. AMYGOODMAN: Our next guest is Andrew Bacevich. He’s a conservative historian.
He spent twenty- three years serving in the US Army. He also lost his son in Iraq. Andrew Bacevich writes, “In joining the Army, my son was following in his father’s footsteps: Before he was born, I had served in Vietnam. As military officers, we shared an ironic kinship of sorts, each of us demonstrating a peculiar knack for picking the wrong war at the wrong time.”Andrew Bacevich holds both parties accountable for the Iraq war. As he writes, “To be fair, responsibility for the war’s continuation now rests no less with the Democrats who control Congress than with the president and his party.
The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. Excepted from The Limits of Power by Andrew J. Download free software Andrew Bacevich Limits Power Pdf. The Limits of Power: Andrew Bacevich on the End of American Exceptionalism. Andrew J Bacevich PDF Subject: The Limits Of Power End American Exceptionalism Andrew. EXCEPTIONALISM ANDREW J BACEVICH PDF The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism - by Andrew J. The End of American Exceptionalism - by Andrew J. Andrew Bacevich: American Power and.
The Limits Of Power End American Exceptionalism Andrew J Bacevich The Limits Of Power End American Exceptionalism Andrew J Bacevich PDF Download The Limits Of Power.
After my son’s death, my state’s senators, Edward M. Kerry, telephoned to express their condolences.
Lynch, our congressman, attended my son’s wake. Kerry was present for the funeral Mass. My family and I greatly appreciated such gestures. But when I suggested to each of them the necessity of ending the war, I got the brushoff.” Bacevich goes on to write, “To whom do Kennedy, Kerry and Lynch listen?
We know the answer: to the same people who have the ear of George W. Bush and Karl Rove — namely, wealthy individuals and institutions.”Andrew Bacevich has just published a new book. It’s called The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. He joins me here in the firehouse studio. Welcome to Democracy Now!, Professor Bacevich. ANDREWBACEVICH: Thank you very much for having me.
AMYGOODMAN: How hard was it to write this book after your son’s death? This is not theoretical for you. ANDREWBACEVICH: Well, I try not to talk about my son’s death, because it’s a private matter, and to tell you the truth, I don’t want to do anything that even looks like it might be exploiting his memory.
I would say that I imagine that some of the energy that informed the writing a book came from the emotional response to my son’s death. But the content, the critique, is unrelated to that tragedy.
The content of the book very much reflects my dismay at the direction of US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. There’s a lot in the book that tries to hold the Bush administration accountable for recent events, but I would not for a second want to suggest that the crisis in which we find ourselves today ought to be laid simply at the foot of the Bush administration or the Republican Party, because it’s been a long time coming. AMYGOODMAN: What do you mean by “exceptionalism”? ANDREWBACEVICH: Well, this is not an idea that’s original with me. It’s clear that from the founding of the Anglo- American colonies, from the time that John Winthrop made his famous sermon and declared that “we shall be as a city upon a hill” a light to the world —- it’s clear that, from the outset, there has been a strong sense among Americans that we are a special people with a providential mission. In the twentieth century, probably going back to roughly the time of Woodrow Wilson, certainly since the end of the Cold War, this concept of a providential mission, a responsibility to the world, has translated into a sense of empowerment or prerogative to determine the way the world is supposed to work, what it’s supposed to look like, and also, over the last twenty years or so, an increasing willingness to use military force to cause the world to look the way we want it to look. And I think that that expression of American exceptionalism is one that’s not only utterly false, but is greatly at odds with own interests as a country.
AMYGOODMAN: You write, . So the focus in the ’9. Clinton era and the focus into the first nine months we saw of the Bush era was very much out there somewhere, you know, where we were going to sort out the problems of the world. Nobody was paying attention to the possibility of actually having to defend the United States of America. So, there we were, spending on defense — well, . AMYGOODMAN: You say the Department of Defense didn’t actually do defense.
It was prepared — it specialized in power projection. ANDREWBACEVICH: It still doesn’t do defense. I mean, it is a remarkable thing, I think, that the reflexive response to 9/1.
Department of Homeland Security, as we call it — but to continue to see the purpose of the Department of Defense, so- called, as power projection. So, what has the Department of Defense been doing for the last seven years since 9/1. Well, been fighting a war in — where? And a second one in Iraq. Now, I think you can make the case for Afghanistan, at least in terms of you can make a case for the necessity of holding the Taliban accountable for having given sanctuary to al- Qaeda. You can’t make any case for the invasion of Iraq as related to the global war on terror.
And frankly, it’s becoming rather difficult, I think, to make a case for the continuation of the Afghanistan war as part of the global war on terror. ANDREWBACEVICH: Well, I mean, you identified me as a conservative, and I don’t deny that label, but I think in this particular context what conservatism means is to be realistic in understanding how the world works and being respectful of history and taking care not to overstate one’s own capacity to influence events. And I think, in that regard, if we look at Afghanistan today, we have to see a country that historically, at least as I understand Afghan history, has never really functioned as an integrated and coherent nation state. It’s never been ruled from Kabul. It’s always been ruled from the — in the provinces by people you might call tribal chiefs. You might call them warlords, you can call them local bosses, but authority has been widely distributed. But we are engaged in a project in which we insist that we’re going to transform Afghanistan into something more or less like a modern, coherent nation state, and indeed, we insist that it has to conform to our notions of liberal democracy.
Were we able to actually do that, I think it would be a wonderful thing. But seven years or so into this project, I’m not sure we can do it. Matter of fact, I’m increasingly persuaded that we can’t do it, and therefore — and I think in your news summary you made reference to this — you know, for somebody like Senator Obama to say, “Elect me. I’ll win the global war on terror by sending more troops to Afghanistan,” I think ought to give people pause and, frankly, ought to cause them to wonder how much change an Obama administration would make with regard to a foreign policy. That’s not an argument for voting for Mc. Cain, by a long shot, but it suggests the narrowness of the debate over foreign policy. AMYGOODMAN: So how is this narrowness taking place?
I mean, yes, you have Mc. Cain saying we’ll be in Iraq for a hundred years. You have Obama speaking out against the war, but he votes with Mc. Cain for funding for the war all through the years —- ANDREWBACEVICH: Right, right, right. AMYGOODMAN: —- as a senator, and then he says we’ll send thousands more, we should send thousands more troops to Afghanistan.
ANDREWBACEVICH: Right, right. I think there are differences between the two, but I think we should see the differences as differences in operational priorities. Mc. Cain insists that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror and that it must be won, and it’s clear that if we, the American people, elect him, that we will be engaged in Iraq for a long, long time. Senator Obama says, “No, Afghanistan is the central front in the global war on terror.
Elect me and will shift our military effort to Afghanistan.” It’s a difference, but it’s a difference in operational priorities; it’s not a difference in strategy. Both of them — Mc. Cain explicitly, I think Obama implicitly — endorse the notion that a global war on terror really provides the right frame for thinking about US national security policy going forward. A real debate would be one in which we would have one candidate, and certainly it would be Mc.
Cain, arguing for the global war on terror and an opponent who was questioning whether the global war on terror makes sense. I don’t think it makes sense. AMYGOODMAN: Talk about this, the global war on terror.
ANDREWBACEVICH: Well, I mean, the phrase itself is one that really ought to cause people to have their heads snap back a little bit, because President Bush and others around him — Rumsfeld was certainly very clear on this — it’s a war, it’s global, and how long is it going to go on? Well, they said from the outset it’s going to go on for decades. In the Pentagon, there’s a phrase that gets used, “generational war,” a war that lasts a generation or more. Well, we need to ask ourselves whether that really makes sense? What are the costs entailed by waging war for a generation? Where does the money come from? What are we not doing because we’re spending all this money on war?
And in a very human sense, who actually pays the cost?